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The political theory of regulation holds that deregulation of utilities obliges the former
monopoly to abandon its rent-seeking activities to concentrate upon economic activities.
However, the arguments presented by scholars to explain this strategic transformation are
not entirely convincing. We argue in this paper that the role and of the nature of the firm
during the deregulation process have been underestimated in previous works. After
describing the main steps of this process, we thus propose a dynamic explanation of the
strategic transformation of the deregulated firm based on the concepts of firm capabilities,
access to rents and transaction costs.1
1. Introduction
Regulation is an integral part of institutional change. There are several general theories
of economic regulation. Challenging the public interest view of regulation, the political theory
of regulation (PTR)1 rejects the argument that “ the normative goal of curing market failures
animates the choice of regulatory policies  ” [Noll, 1989]. Instead, the PTR argues that
regulation is produced by the capture of public institutions by interest groups, in order to
acquire monopoly rents or redistribute wealth to themselves [Stigler, 1971]. Since all interests
affected by regulation decisions are not represented with equal effectiveness, circumstances
favor an inefficient outcome where rent is dissipated among a few interest groups [Peltzman,
1976].
Regulation sets the rules of the economic and social game and thereby the incentives
faced by the different actors. By attempting to analyze regulation and deregulation,
economists have in general aimed at restraints on market firms’ behavior or new rules that
have originated in law [Priest, 1993].  Different attempts have been made to discriminate
between different types of regulation [Hägg, 1997].  In this article, we widen the concept
‘economic regulation’, usually reserved for administrative control of prices, production, taxes,
and market restrictions, to include new aspects of legislation and administrative control.
Moreover, we do not limit the meaning to price fixing and we exclude social regulation as
consumer or environmental protection.  However, important aspects of public and regulatory
governance are included.
                                             
1 / We use here the term “ political theory of regulation ” to gather all the approaches that challenge the “ public
interest theory of regulation ”, i.e. the view according to which regulators are fully-informed representatives of
the public interest. Other terms are also frequent in the literature to talk about this political theory of regulation,
as capture theory [Stigler, 1971], private interest theory [Noll, 1989], interest group theory [Noll, 1989] or even
economic theory of regulation [Kaserman, Mayo and Pacey, 1993] [Hägg, 1997].2
In the particular case of utilities2, one effectively organized interest group is given a
monopoly covered by regulators [Stigler, 1971]. The regulated business and its employees are
then participants in the formation and execution of regulatory policy, and share the rent that is
thereby attained. The firm involved in utilities is primarily concerned with rent-seeking rather
than being concerned with economic questions. One prediction from this analysis is thus that a
relaxation of regulation, i.e. deregulation, ought to cause harder times for the former
monopoly. Deregulation would enhance efficiency because the former monopoly is not
insulated from actual competition anymore, particularly the competition of new entrants
[Winston, 1993]. Facing this new competition, the firm would give up its rent seeking
activities to concentrate on economic ones. This is what we call in this article the “ strategic
transformation of the deregulated firm ”.
The evolution of British Telecom illustrates this strategic transformation. In 1982,
when the deregulation of telecommunications in Britain began, BT took strong positions in
the regulatory debate against wide and rapid deregulation. Presently however BT is one of the
main defenders of deregulation in Europe. How can we explain such a strategic
transformation?
After two decades of deregulation in the United States and one decade in Europe, this
strategic transformation seems to take a longer time than provided by the PTR [Vietor, 1994],
and there are even sectors in which it has never been completed [Teske et al., 1994]. We think
that this comes from a misunderstanding of this phenomena. The purpose of this article is thus
to provide a theoretical framework to explain more precisely this strategic transformation, and
to identify the conditions under which it may occur.
We will show in part one of this work that, within the PTR, neither the public choice
view nor the New Institutional Economics (NIE) view can offer a fully satisfactory
                                             
2/ We refer here to all kinds of utility markets that have been (or that could be) deregulated around the world, and
whose former stage of regulation had created the monopoly of one firm (or public organization): electricity, gas,3
explanation to the strategic transformation of deregulated monopolies. Far from renouncing to
the view conveyed by the PTR, we will show that this explanatory problem does not emanate
from the seminal hypothesis of the PTR, but from the lack of taking into account of the
complex mechanisms affecting the deregulated firm involved in utilities. In part two, we will
then introduce these mechanisms through a conception of the firm in which the development
of new competencies requires time and investment. In a part three, we will integrate this
approach of the firm into a theoretical framework consistent with the seminal insights of the
PTR. In part four, we analyze two kinds of influences that design the strategic transformation
of the firm along the deregulation process.
2. PTR and Deregulation
Inside the PTR, two parallel views can be used to explain the strategic transformation
of the deregulated utility firm: the “ public choice view ”, and the “ neo-institutional view ”.
The former has formalized political market behaviors through neo-classical models of supply
and demand, where votes play the same role as prices in traditional economic models
[Buchanan and Tullock, 1962]. The latter takes more into account the institutional aspects of
regulation focusing on incentives, informational problems and transaction costs,
demonstrating the existence of structure-induced equilibria [Shepsle and Weingast, 1981].
Both views help to understand the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm, but neither
explains it adequately.
2.1. The Public Choice View of Regulation
Seminal hypothesis. Stigler’s work [1971] was one of the most influential
contributions from the public choice view of regulation, even if he drew his thoughts from
many previous examinations of the political process [Downs, 1950, Buchanan and Tullock,
1962]. Stigler described government regulation as a supply and demand process, with interest
                                                                                                                                            
airlines, telecommunications, water, broadcasting, etc.4
groups (firms, influential customers, tax payers, etc.) on the demand side and legislative
representatives and political parties on the supply side. This proposition suggests that
regulation is created on a political market, where interest groups demand  a transfer of wealth
(challenging the existing property rights structures). The political market distributes regulation
rules favorable to the interest groups that can convince the state to use its power of coercion.
The essence of deregulation. Peltzman [1976] later formalized the Stigler’s analysis.
He assumed that the utility-maximizing behavior of politicians (congressmen, local
administrators, etc.) could be predicted by viewing them as majority maximizers. The
legislators’ behavior is driven by their desire to remain in office. The public choice theory
implies that legislators attempt to allocate efficiently political favors. The result is that the
political efficiency desired by legislators is not equivalent to economic efficiency: regulation
is likely to be biased towards benefiting interest groups that are better organized, since they
are more effective at delivering political support and gain more from favorable legislation, and
since that they are willing to invest resources in acquiring political support [Olson, 1965].
That is why the theory predicts that only deregulation can restore economic efficiency. The
politicians decide to deregulate when the marginal opposition to redistribution is greater than
the marginal political support, and regulate when the reverse is true [Jarrell, 1984]3.
Regulatory monopolies and the political market. As suggested by Jarrell [1978] or
Schleifer and Vishny [1994], state-owned and regulated firms are highly inefficient and their
inefficiency is the result of political pressures from politicians. To keep high monopoly rents,
regulated utility firms are, for example, encouraged by politicians to employ too many people,
to produce goods desired by politicians rather than by consumers, or to locate their production
                                             
3 / There is a controversy in economic analysis about real costs and benefits of deregulation [Lott and Reynolds,
1989; Poitras and Sutter, 1997]. Some authors, furthering Stigler [1971] or Peltzman [1976] assume that a
symmetry exists between regulation and deregulation. Some others [Crew and Rowley, 1988], on the contrary,
argue that the recoverable part of the monopoly deadweight loss is reduced to the extent that the costs of
obtaining the regulations (through rent-seeking) are sunk. Somehow, in both cases, the decision to deregulate is
based on the assumption that costs and benefits of deregulation can be assessed precisely ex-ante.5
in politically desirable rather than economically attractive regions. All these inefficiencies are
produced by the rent-seeking game between politicians, firm managers and voters.
According to the public choice view of regulation, what would incite the firm involved
in utilities to give up to rent-seeking activities? In the public choice view firm decisions result
from a rational cost-benefit analysis. On the benefit side, deregulation limits the rent
obtainable on the political market and create new sources of rents on the economic market.
Then it incites utility firms to stop these rent-seeking activities to focus on economic activities
[Noll and Owen, 1983]. On the cost side, the public choice view of regulation shows that rent-
seeking activities generate some costs that limit its attractiveness for firms and interest groups.
For Stigler [1971], two costs are involved. The first is the cost of information [Laffont and
Tirole, 1991]. Pressuring legislative representatives is infrequent and usually concerned with a
package of issues, so interest groups must incur costs to become informed about particular
issues and politicians. The second cost is that of organizing. Interest groups and firms must
organize to express their interest to politicians and bureaucrats. Posner [1974] considers these
costs of organizing in more details, refering to the theory of cartels [costs of arriving to an
agreement and enforcing this agreement) and the free-rider problem4 [Olson, 1965]. These
costs due to political action, if they become greater than potential benefits, may trigger the
strategic transformation of the deregulated firm.
2.2. Limits of the Public Choice View
2.2.1. Costs of rent-seeking can not explain the strategic transformation of firms involved in
utilities
One criticism of the public choice explanation of the strategic transformation of the
deregulated firm is that the former monopoly is considered as a normal political actor, bearing
all the costs of rent-seeking. However, it is not really exposed to the traditional costs of the
                                             
4/ Each member of an interest group has the natural incentive to avoid paying his full share of the burden either
monetarily or in terms of time.6
political action since it can act alone on the political market. The political action is not
therefore a collective action [Olson, 1965] for the former monopoly in the period of
deregulation, and does not incur the increased costs of collaboration.
First, the deregulated firm can get the relevant information at a lower cost than can
new entrants, since the deregulated firm has much more experience of where it may find
information and what it must do to obtain it. Secondly, the deregulated firm does not have to
face the free-rider problem since it has enough political impact, thanks to its size or the
financial amounts at stake, to singlehandedly influence politicians and bureaucrats that make
decisions regarding deregulation. Third, the deregulated firm has a lot to gain from a stopping
of the deregulation process. It could thus keep its monopoly rents if it so chooses.
Thus, the deregulated firm seems to retain a significant incentive to bet on rent-seeking
activities even when deregulation has started. Why would the deregulated firm try to pursue
uncertain rents on the economic market when it can choose to keep its monopoly rent on the
political market? Costs of rent-seeking can not fully explain the strategic transformation of the
deregulated firm.
2.2.2. Benefits of a firm’s action can not be easily assessed during deregulation
The public choice view does not take into account the complexity of deregulation.
One of the limitations of the public choice view is that it models politicians as simple brokers
choosing among competiting private demand for regulation [McChesney, 1987]. Since
politicians are assumed to be the interface between the State and private interests, institutional
structures that drive to the creation of regulation are also assumed to be standardized political
markets. As noticed by Viscusi et al. [1995]:
“ an important assumption in the model of Stigler and Peltzman is that interest
groups directly influence the regulatory policies. However, when one thinks about
the process by which regulation is determined, one realizes there are numerous
actors ”5.
                                             
5/ page 339.7
Political markets are sometimes considered to work the same way everywhere, with the same
kind of actors. However, this is not an acceptable assumption since regulated activities are
different in terms of political importance, and also since institutional mechanisms governing
political exchanges are different everywhere. Institutional structures are thus often far more
complex than described by the public choice view. On political markets, actors have an
imperfect understanding of the issues affecting them, and thus face high costs of transacting
[Krueger, 1988]. This complexity renders a straightforward cost-benefit analysis very
difficult.
Nobody knows what the final result of deregulation will be. Changes in regulation
inevitably involve uncertainty concerning the ultimate impacts, and frequently surprises as
well [Kahn, 1988; Crandall, 1988]. Deregulation is not a simple decision that occurs at a
moment of time, but is an evolving sequence of decisions. The costs and benefits of a strategy
during deregulation are thus very hard to assess [Rizzo and O’Driscoll, 1985]. As explained
by North [1990],
“ a theory of institutions demands a relaxation of the rationality assumptions of
the neo-classical theory ” (...) [It must be built on] “ the assumptions of costly
information, of subjective models on the part of the actors to explain their
environment and of imperfect enforcement of agreements ”6.
A cost-benefit analysis can therefore not be the only rule that drives the strategic
transformation of the deregulated firm. Benefits of one kind of strategy or the other are so
uncertain and difficult to assess that few firms would bold enough to implement a radical
change in strategy, such as one from rent-seeking activities to economic activities. Even if
regulation and competition evolve through time, the firm can not give up its political know-
how overnight. For instance, one could imagine that the firm will try to continue rent-seeking
activities to put a brake on deregulation, while investing in economic activities to prepare to
face new competitors. Empirically, there are markets in which firms continue to capture most8
state regulators, sustaining monopoly rents even after many years of deregulation. This is the
case for trucking deregulation in the United States [Teske et al., 1994]. The public choice
view does not provide any explanation of this strategic articulation of political and economic
strategies during deregulation. This is because the existence of a deregulation process,
involving complex institutional mechanisms, is not taken into account. Inside the PTR, the
New Institutional Economics propositions overcome some of these critics.
2.3. The Neo-Institutional View of Regulation
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) has made important contributions to the PTR,
allowing it to coexist with the public-interest theory. These contributions are based on the
introduction into interest-group models of imperfect information and transaction costs. This
leads to an approach based on political processes to explain the making of economic policy.
Uncertainty. In political markets, complexity and uncertainty are more pronounced
than in economic markets [North, 1990; Dixit, 1996]. Political contracts are even less
complete (informal substitutes can emerge, information asymmetries and moral hazard are
often prevalent, etc.). To cope with these high transaction costs in politics, the New
Institutional Economics stresses the role of credible commitments, that is to say commitments
that are clear and observable to all actors ex-ante, and irreversible ex-post [Levy and Spiller,
1994]. The role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and thus to
enable people to make decisions. These institutions are developed through time, and are
specific to each area.
“ Institutions are regularities in competitive interactions among individuals. They
provide a framework within which people have some confidence as to how
outcomes will be determined ” [North, 1986, pp. 231].
Being regularities, institutions create periods of stability in regulation.
                                                                                                                                            
6/ pp.355.9
The stability of regulation. Reducing transaction costs on the political market, the
credible commitment also generates stability in the regulatory governance [Levy and Spiller,
1994], and so in the allocation of property rights. The regulatory governance is constituted of
institutional arrangements that tend to yield stable outcomes. To explain this stability, NIE
scholars have turned their attention from simple majority rule institutions to the study of more
complex institutions with specific rules governing agenda control. Shepsle and Weingast
[1981] refer here to "structure-induced equilibrium". Reaching such a structure-induced
equilibrium means that the set of decision makers is partitioned, for example, into
parliamentary committees, and the set of alternatives is divided, for example, into
jurisdictions. Committees are thus given exclusive property rights over specific jurisdictions,
and have a monopoly of agenda control for instituting change7.
What is an equilibrium on the political market for the NIE? An equilibrium is
reached when the process of readjustment is completed and there are no further change in the
constraints [property rights structure, transaction costs, etc.). The system is then in a state of
rest where individuals are unable or unwilling to make further adjustments. This equilibrium
is a bit different from the well-known long-term equilibrium outcome of a competitive
industry8. Indeed, this long-run equilibrium is not sought by individual firms, but is rather an
unintended outcome of a sequence of decisions by firms that adjust to change in their
constraints. In the New Institutional Economics’ perspective, actors try only to reach a short-
run equilibrium [Eggertsson, 1993].
The deregulation process is a great cause of uncertainty. The existence of these
structure-induced equilibrium situations does not mean that regulation is always stable. This is
what Weingast [1981] expresses in the case of regulation in the United States. Taking various
                                             
7/ See Spiller and Vogelsang [1996] for a similar theoretical framework applied to the deregulation of British
Telecom. See also Steunenberg [1996] for a study of institutional mechanisms in Europe.10
examples, he shows that policy remains stable and beneficial to congressional-agency clientele
only as long as the relevant variable of public opinion, balance of power of interest groups,
presidential initiative, and judiciary decisions are stable. As long as these variables remain
constant, the political rewards from various alternatives remain constant too. These actors play
the same role in political markets as entrepreneurs do in economic markets [Ricketts, 1987].
They are vectors of change through their short-term decisions.
Deregulation alternates between periods of equilibrium and periods of
disequilibrium. The most important point to stress is the existence of a deregulation process.
Economic policymaking is thus a dynamic game, whose conditions are uncertain and
changing, and whose rules are at least partially made by participants as they go along. Each
participant will try to manipulate the operation of the subsequent game to try to achieve an
outcome that favors his or her own interest. The political process of economic policymaking is
constantly influenced by the legislature or its agencies, the courts, various special-interest
lobbies, the media, and so on. This gives particular importance to the actors who control the
political agenda [Weingast, 1981].
In this process, the degrees of freedom of each actor mostly consist of opportunities to
make various strategic moves. These strategic moves then often trigger regulatory changes,
making the political market evolve from equilibrium to disequilibrium. Disequilibrium in the
political market occurs when a debate is opened concerning the adoption of a new regulation
(or the evolution of the former regulation). If proponents of the new regulation have enough
political influence, this new regulation will be adopted, and the political market will reach a
new equilibrium. If it is not the case, the period of disequilibirum results in a return to the
status quo. Thus, each period of disequilibrium does not necessarily lead to the definition of a
new equilibrium. In many cases, status quo prevails over all other propositions. In this way, it
                                                                                                                                            
8/ Equilibrium in a competitive industry generally refers to a situation where each firm operates in the lowest
point of the average cost curve for a factory of an optimum size, and where each firm receives only the normal11
can not be denied that there are institutional forces of selection that incite the firm to the
strategic transformation of the deregulated firm.
2.4. Limits of The Neo-Institutional View of Regulation
The weak role given to firms in the deregulation process. In the NIE’approach,
strategic decisions of firms are taken for granted, or even wiped out of the model. In
Weingast’s [1981] view of deregulation of airlines, strategies of airline carriers, for instance,
are taken for granted. It means that they play a role in deregulation, lobbying the Commerce
Committee to brake the deregulation movement, but one never knows precisely why they
adopt this strategy and in what extent it can evolve. Weingast considers forces that question
policy equilibrium, thus leading to regulatory change, but not the effect of this regulatory
change on the strategic transformation of the firm. In Levy and Spiller’s [1994] approach, the
focus is on the effects of the institutional governance of countries on private investment, but
they do not address the question of the effects of this governance on the strategies.
The neo-institutional view of regulation overcomes only a part of the criticisms
we raise about the public choice view. The fundamental limit of the NIE approach to explain
the strategic transformation is that there is still no proposition concerning the set of criteria on
which a firm bases its strategic decisions [especially those concerning the arbitrage or the
articulation between rent-seeking and economic activities). These criteria are even less present
in the neo-institutional literature than it is in the literature of public choice, where strategic
decisions were assumed to be based on cost-benefit analysis. In the NIE view of regulation,
the strategic decision made by the firm seem to be determined by its environment. This leads
to the idea that all the firms would adopt the same strategic decisions if their institutional
                                                                                                                                            
rate of return on its capital, where returns are equalized across all industries.12
environment were the same. However, strategies of firms remain different even when
deregulation has begun. Teske [1991] compares the strategies of seven firms created after the
AT&T’s divestiture, and shows a wide range of differences between them. The institutional
environment can thus not be the unique factor determining the strategies of firms.
This means that the neo-institutional approach does not provide a fully satisfactory
answer to the question of the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm, from rent
seeking strategies to market activities. We know that the evolution of regulatory governance
plays a part in this strategic transformation, but we do not currently know how it affects the
strategic behavior of the deregulated firm. Put another way, we lack a theory of the firm
compatible with neo-institutional insights i.e. a theoretical framework that explains why a
firm adopts one kind of strategy over another during the deregulation process. Recent
developments of the theory of the firm, especially the competence-based theory, provide new
insights in terms of internal knowledge, skills and know-how. The purpose of part three will
be to establish a good connection between NIE propositions and these recent approaches to
the nature of the firm.
3. Rent, Capabilities, and Strategic Choices in a Deregulated Firm
We first show that recent works addressing the theory of the firm can aid in explaining
how a firm adopts strategic decisions in real time. Then, we determine the particular decision
function of a deregulated firm. Finally, we identify the various strategies that a former
monopoly can adopt during the deregulation process.
3.1. Insights From the Modern Theory of the Firm
Economists studying business and industrial organization have long recognized the
inadequacy of the neoclassical view of the firm and have developed richer paradigms and
models based on the concepts of various kinds of transaction costs and on capabilities that are
specific to the firm. Furthering the work of these scholars, we argue here that proposed13
dynamic and institutional arguments to understand political processes must also be used to
analyze the firm. We simply propose a readjustment of assumptions, to render theories of the
institutional environment consistent with theories of the firm.
Firms are also institutional choices whose purpose is to reduce uncertainty. In the
modern theory of the firm, the creation of a firm implies a comparative choice between one
kind of organization and another [Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975]. The proposed structure
aims to minimize combined transaction costs and production costs. It does so in two ways.
First, it provides a contracting response to the moral-hazard or hold-up costs that may arise in
the short run [Alchian and Woodward, 1988]. Second, it allows organizational learning to take
place within the framework of the firm [Langlois, 1992]. When one focuses on economic
change, this second point is particularly important.
Strategic decisions first emanate from the capabilities of the firm. Since the firm
has to face the huge uncertainty created by competitive forces, the vast majority of the
decisions that are made by individuals within the firm are routine [Nelson and Winter, 1982].
These decisions use the cumulative experience of individuals, i.e. the experience that has
passed the test of time and is embodied in savoir-faire and technologies. Organizations
possess a pool of embodied knowledge useful for particular classes of activities. Further to
Langlois [1992], we will use the term capabilities to characterize this knowledge. Capabilities
are selected throughout the history of the firm: knowledge that is no longer useful nor reliable,
is eventually given up by people inside the firm [Dosi, Teece, and Winter, 1990]. Therefore,
strategic decisions of the firm largely depend on the past states through which the organization
has traveled, which are synthetized within its existing capabilities.
Strategic decisions are also constrained by the expected rent criteria. Most of the
strategic decisions, since they are based on routines, can be accomplished within the existing
contracting framework of the firm. But there are also circumstances that are not spelled out in
this existing contract framework, and which require a decision engaging the firm in one14
strategic direction or another. Organizations act as an entity, because some people in these
organizations own the residual rights9 and take those strategic decisions. These people behave
as entrepreneurs, which means that they try to forecast the future and engage the firm in
projects hoping for future returns [Mises, 1949]. One of the direct impacts their decisions
have is on the selection of the capabilities that the firm will develop. Because of the nature of
specialization and the limit to cognition, organizations as well as individuals are limited in
what they know how to do effectively [Langlois, 1992]. The role of those who own the
residual rights is to try to select the capabilities that will enable the firm to secure profits and
rents in the future [Foss, 1994]. Consequently, the strategic decisions of the firm are also
determined by the level of rent that the firm can expect, taking into account economic
markets, competitors, regulations, etc.
Ex-ante strategic decisions are thus determined by two features of organizations:
first, the existing capabilities that reflect what the firm knows how to do effectively and the
types of knowledge it accumulates; second, the expected rent that people owning residual
rights hope to receive after analyzing markets and competitors, calculating costs, and
estimating future profits. The strategic decision within the firm springs from the interaction
between these two features.
3.2. The Strategic Decision Function of a Deregulated Firm
For a deregulated firm, we assume that there are two kinds of rent:
•  Political rent, which is rent derived of the former regulatory governance (rent from the
incumbent firm). This rent is linked to the monopoly position that has been granted to the firm
on the utility market.
                                             
9/ We refer here to the literature on incomplete contracts, which assumes that a contractual framework cannot
anticipate all the contingencies that might occur. It differentiates specific rights spelled out in contracts, and
residual rights that can not be spelled out [Grossman and Hart, 1986]. In unanticipated circumstances, decisions
are taken by those owning the residual rights.15
•  Economic rent, which is rent created by the new economic opportunities that occur during
the deregulation process (created by innovation, first mover advantage, differenciation,
opening new markets, declining frontiers between activities, international arbitrage on prices,
etc.).
Deregulated firms have two kinds of existing capabilities:
•  Political capabilities, which allow the firm to influence the creation of new regulations.
They are accumulated knowledge concerning regulatory agencies, ministries or legislatures.
Thanks to these capabilities, the firm knows how it can use its institutional environment to get
favorable regulation or how it should strategically react to an unfavorable regulation.
•  Economic capabilities, i.e. accumulated knowledge concerning the function of economic
markets, the way to organize to improve productivity, the level of prices, the strategic
behaviors of competitors, etc.
The strategic decision function of a deregulated firm. Existing capabilities and
expected rents, in either the political realm or the market, are thus the variables that we can
take into account here to explain strategic decisions made by a deregulated firm. Furthering
Weingast ‘s [1981] work, we will consider the strategic direction of the deregulated firm with
regard to its position in the debate for the creation of regulation. The decision function of a
typical deregulated firm, for a given insitutional environment, can be written as:
xF = f [Re, Ce, Rp, Cp], where:
- xF  is the position that the firm will choose in the regulation debate10. It may be equal to
the status x0 or differ from it.
- Re represents the economic rents that the firm can expect after each regulatory evolution
- Ce represents the economic capabilities of the firm
- Rp represents the political rent that the firm can expect after each regulatory evolution
- Cp represents the political capabilities of the firm.
                                             
10/ We refer here to Weingast and Schepsle’s [1981] model, where they assume an m-dimensional policy space,
X, of feasible outcomes. The status quo is x0 and actors of the political process make proposals to alter this status
quo.16
3.3. Four Types of Strategies
Following our argument, xF, the position chosen by the firm in the deregulation
debate, also expresses the overall strategy of the firm, integrating political and economic
strategies. In some cases, economic and political actions are substitutes, while in others they
are complementary [Taylor, 1996; Vietor, 1994]. In the case of substitution, the firm adopts
pure strategies, either political or economic. In the case of complementarity, the firm adopts
mixed strategies. Political and economic actions are complementary if political and economic
capabilities inside the firm are complementary [Teece, 1986].
3.3.1. Pure Political Strategies
The firm defends the status quo position (xF ≤ x0). This is the typical behavior of a
regulated firm engaged in utilities before the beginning of the deregulation process. Before
deregulation, the firm has a monopoly on the market of utilities and develop political
capabilities. It is not encouraged to develop economic capabilities: people who are part of the
the regulated firm are assumed to be focused on acquiring rents through political markets, and
on continually investing in political capabilities. Those assumptions are consistent with results
obtained by Averch and Johnson [1962] when they show that a regulated firm may select a
more capital-intensive technology than an unregulated firm does. As Alchian and Kessel
[1962] have pointed out, professional managers will prefer decisions inflating certain costs
that increase their on-the-job consumption. De Alessi [1980] shows that these effects are even
more flagrant in what he calls “ political firms ”, i.e. any organization owned by a local or
national political unit that employs labor services and material inputs to produce commodities.
This is the case for many regulated firms involved in utilities, particularly in Europe. Political
capabilities are predominant within the firm. Economic capabilities still exist, but they are
devoted to the pursuit of political rents. For instance, such economic capabilities may play a
role in the creation of a politically powerful innovation that does not correspond to a true17
demand of the market. Economic capabilities in such a firm are therefore totally dependent on
political capabilities11.
3.3.2.Pure Economic Strategy
The firm bets on its economic capabilities. It engages in competitive behavior,
pursuing rents and profits through economic markets. It has given up rent-seeking
monopolistic strategies. Complementarities that are concerned in this strategy are simply
complementarities between economic capabilities in order to take advantage of market
opportunities, and to tackle competition from new entrants and innovative firms. Political
capabilities may still exist within the firm, but they are still dependent on economic
capabilities. To specify this kind of strategy, we introduce xR, the regulation that is finally
adopted. With a purely economic strategy, the firm adopts the position xF, with xF ≥ xR.
3.3.3. Defensive Mixed Strategy
The firm tries to put a brake on the deregulation process, retaining the most important
part of its monopoly, but also preparing actively for future competition. The firm needs time
to be able to compete, and rent-seeking activities are a stalling tactic aimed at providing this
time. This strategy implies complementarity between traditional political capabilities
(relations with traditional industrial and regulatory authorities) and economic capabilities
(product innovation capabilities, ability to lower prices, etc.). In this strategy, both types of
capabilities are dependent on each other. A defensive mixed strategy is thus xF , with xR > xF
≥ x0.
                                             
11/ This idea of dependence of one set of capabilities or another has been developed by Teece [1986] in the case
of innovation. Teece considers that the dependence of one asset on another is high when the first can not be
converted at low cost to another activity, which does not concern the second asset. Here, we apply this idea to the
particular case of political and economic capabilities.18
3.3.4. Offensive Mixed Strategy
The firm tries to increase the speed of the deregulation process to get more freedom in
prices fixation, diversification, or the penetration of foreign markets. Its economic capabilities
increase faster than the deregulation process, which means that the firm can take advantage of
all the strategic opportunities it desires. This strategy generally aims at limiting the power of
regulatory authorities that have been created during the deregulation process. The current
strategy of British Telecom, which claims that the regulator, the Oftel, overextends its powers,
appears to be of this kind12. The offensive mixed strategy implies another kind of
complementarity: between new political capabilities, i.e. concerning the relations with
institutional actors that appeared during deregulation process (independant regulator, anti-trust
authorities, etc.) and new economic capabilities, i.e. capabilities that the firm tries to develop
to become a competitive player. If the firm wants to develop these economic capabilities, a
lobbying intervention, requiring new political capabilities, may be necessary. Here again, both
kinds of capabilities are dependant on each other, but the role of political capabilities is
opposite to that played in a defensive mixed strategy. An offensive mixed strategy is thus xF,
with xF > xR > x0.
Table 1 synthetizes these various strategies of the former monopoly.
Table 1: Typologies of the Strategies of a Deregulated Firm
IMPEDE THE
DEREGULATION PROCESS






The strategic transformation has not begun
Pure economic strategy
xF  ≥ xR




xR > xF ≥ x0
The strategic transformation is engaged
Offensive mixed strategy
xF > xR > x0
The strategic transformation is completed, but
the sector is still regulated. The firm tries to
accelerate the deregulation process.
                                             
12/ British Telecom has tried to enter the British TV market, but regulation created by the Oftel [British Office of
Telecommunications] has rendered this move impossible.19
The questions that our article adresses now become: why do political capabilities
and expected political rents shrink during the deregulation process, whereas economic
capabilities and expected economic rents rapidly develop? Why would deregulated firms
adopt pure economic strategies when they could adopt mixed strategies?
4. External Influences and Internal Mechanisms Leading to Strategic Transformation
To answer these questions, we show that the deregulation process implies two kinds of
influences, external and internal, on the decision function of the firm. First, some external
influences, taking into account the particular consequences of each phase of the process, play
an important role. They are constraints on economic calculus, negociations, and degree of
freedom of actors during the deregulation process. Second, some internal influences relate to
the creation of capabilities, and to the evolution of complementarity between economic and
political capabilities within the firm.
4.1. External Influences
External influences come from changes in regulatory governance. The overall
institutional environment remains fixed, but regulatory governance and regulatory incentives
evolve through time. We start by identifying the main steps of a typical deregulation process.
Then, we study the influence of these main steps on the variables that constitute the decision
function of the deregulated firm.
4.1.1. Assumptions About the Deregulation Process
The institutional environment in which the deregulation occurs. We do not focus
here on the institutional environment, but on the strategic behavior of the deregulated firm and
on its ability to pressure public authorities to influence the evolution of the deregulation
process. Therefore, we assume that the overall institutional environment is fixed during this
process. The distribution of property rights may change due to evolutions in regulation, but20
the mode of distribution remains unchanged. Moreover, this institutional environment is
assumed to eventually allow for the creation of a structure-induced equilibrium when a
regulation debate is opened. It is this ability to reach a structure-induced equilibrium that
guarantees the stability of the institutional environment [Weingast and Shepsle, 1981].
Some general steps of the deregulation process. The first task is to define the
process we will study. Since the institutional environment is different in each country, there
are multiple designs for political processes. However, most of the time, some common steps
can be found in all utilities deregulation. During these common steps, an important question
about deregulation is treated. We thus consider that decisions adopted at these general steps
are idiosyncrasic ones, but that the steps themselves are valid for all processes. Depending on
a full achievement, these main steps of the deregulation process can be:
•  Dismantling
•  Partial opening of the market
•  Privatization13
•  Partial opening of the market
•  Creation of an independent authority
•  Wide opening of the market14
At each step, an equilibrium is reached. Each step creates a debate and trade-off among
actors on the political market. Debates lead either to a new state of equilibrium or a return to
the status quo. Nonetheless, a new equilibrium doesn’t mean that the regulation which has
been proposed is fully adopted. There are various degree of adoption, and each actor in the
political market may adopt a different position, more or less far from the status quo position.
For example, in a privatization debate, some actors may propose to privatize more than 50%
of the former monopoly, some others 30% and others 0%. The structure-induced equilibrium
                                             
13/ Privatization  was not a part of the deregulation process of utilities in the United States, since most of the
firms were private  or public. Nonetheless, we introduce it into the theoretical framework because it is an
important part of this process in Europe and in many developing countries [Levy and Spiller, 1996].
14/ We devote special attention to the opening of markets to competitors since, after a period of regulation, a
strong competition and long-run growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous
[Eliasson, 1991].21
framework then determines which solution is the equilibrium, taking into account the position
and the relative political influence of each actor.
As we expressed before, x0 is the status quo policy for the regulation of this sector, xR,
the regulation adopted and xF, the regulation that the firm would have liked to be adopted.
Decisions are taken one after another, step by step. The process has the following features:
•  If xR = x0, the process of deregulation does not evolve. Regulation remains
unchanged.
•  If xR > x0, the process of deregulation evolves towards more competition.
•  If xR = xF, the process of deregulation evolves as wishes the deregulated
firm. Its political capabilities are truly effective.
•  If xR > xF, the process of deregulation evolves more rapidly that the
deregulated firm wishes. This indicates that the firm’s political capabilities
are not as efficient as it would have liked it to be. In this case, the firm loses
some part of the political rent guaranteed by regulation.
•  If xF = x0, the deregulated firm wishes that the deregulation process does not
evolve, and thus lobbies politicians and bureaucrats to try to keep its current
rents (political strategy or defensive mixed strategy).
•  The more xF is superior to xR, the more the firm tries to accelerate the
deregulation process (offensive mixed strategy).
4.1.2. External Influences on Both Types of Expected Rents and Existing Capabilities
The purpose of this part is to assess the particular impact of each general step of the
deregulation process on the decision function of the firm, and thus on the type of strategy
chosen (either purely political, defensive mixed, offensive mixed, or purely economic). These
impacts are considered independently, i.e. the order in which they occur is assumed to be of
little importance.
Dismantling. Political capabilities of the firm, which are related to its size15 strongly
decrease. The firm becomes a more normal actor on the political market, which means that it
has to constitute an interest-group to be able to enter the political market. Political action
becomes very hard to manage, because of free-rider problems, and difficulty in organizing
                                             
15/ This proposition that political capabilities of a firm are linked to its size has been supported by many scholars.
For instance, see Posner [1974] when he wrote: “ I used to think that there was one case in which the theory
yielded an unequivocal and testable prediction. That is where the number of firms in the industry is small,22
with other political actors. The rent that the firm can expect on the political market becomes
lower. This reduces the incentive for the firm to adopt political strategies. Furthermore, the
economic capabilities of the firm are also lower. Indeed, the dismantling has questioned the
existing organization. All the parts of the former monopoly have lost some capabilities.
Privatization.  The political capabilities of the firm become less effective. Indeed,
many of these capabilities are based on the particular relationships between the former
monopoly and the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance. Privatization of state-owned firm is a
major political objective, and the government can not neglect it. Particularly, it can not afford
to reduce profitability for private investors. Perspectives of deregulation must be favorable to
the former monopoly. This is a great opportunity for defensive mixed strategy. However,
when privatization has been completed, rent-seeking behaviors of the former monopoly are
less effective. Conversely, the economic rent is more likely to be appropriated and new private
investors push the former monopoly to pursue this rent.
Creation of an independant regulatory authority. This point is related to the
American debate on the regulation by commission of any form. The Parliament and
government are looking for a new commission which has a legal basis for legitimate activity.
In many countries, new regulatory authorities are created in order to head up the deregulation
process.  In fact, they modify the regulatory governance, i.e. the functioning of the political
market. Therefore, existing political capabilities of the former monopoly are not as effective
as they were before [Bonardi and Quélin, 1998]. To be efficient in this political market, the
firm would have to create new political capabilities,  but the decision to create these
capabilities is in odds with by the decision to create economic capabilities.
In addition, the expected political rent decreases, because independant regulators can
take unilateral decisions such as price controls (changing of price-cap or of the rate of return
                                                                                                                                            
thereby facilitating the organization for effective political action, but the number of employees in the industry is
great ”.23
in the case of telecommunications for instance). These decisions are not directly submitted to
traditional institutional channels, which means that the political rent decreases with little
possibility for the firm to react or counter.
Partial opening of the market. Not only does the regulatory governance evolve, but
also the competitive environment, through the gradual entry of competitors during the
deregulation process. These competitors have economic capabilities that allow them to be
more efficient, in certain aeras, than the incumbent firm. But, by doing so, they also reveal
competitive information to the incumbent (concerning costs, prices, types of persons to
employ, organization, etc.). The incumbent firm can then imitate its competitors in order to
accelerate the growth of its economic capabilities.
The expected political rent strongly decreases because new entrants also create
competition on the political market [Becker, 1983]. They can adopt political strategies to
compete against the rent-seeking strategies of the former monopoly, which will accelerate the
deregulation of the market. The political market becomes contestable [Crew and Rowley,
1988], and strategic lobbying by potential industry entrants [Glazer and Konrad, 1995] is more
and more efficient.
Wide opening of the market. Many competitors have appeared in all markets. The
deregulated firm must create new products, new services, or new pricing to be competitive.
The creation of new economic capabilities moves quickly. Moreover, the market for economic
capabilities has improved, which means that many economic capabilities are available through
contracts with other firms. Dynamic transaction costs have shrunk [Langlois, 1992]. Then, the
firm need not develop all the capabilities that are required, which accelerates its launch into
new activities. Economic rent continues to rise since the economic capabilities that have been
developed or acquired previously have become effective. Expected political rent has
decreased significantly since there is no more monopoly position to defend.24
Table 2 sums up these external influences of the deregulation process on the decision
function of the former monopoly.
Table 2: Deregulation Process and Impacts on the Incumbent Firm
General steps of the
 deregulation process
Influence on the incumbent firm decision function
if the decision is fully adopted at period t
Dismantling
•  Cp






t  > Ce
t+1
Privatization •  Cp
t  > Cp
t+1
•  Re
t  < Re
t+1
Creation of an independent
regulatory authority
•  Cp









t  < Ce
t+1





t  < Re
t+1
•  Ce
t  < Ce
t+1
External influences and strategic transformation. The analysis of each particular
phase of the deregulation process provides fruitful insights into the strategic transformation of
the deregulated firm. It explains why the firm has incentive to develop its economic
capabilities, while its political capabilities are not as effective as they were before. It also
explains why the expected political rent is decreasing progressively, while at the same time
the entry of new competitors and the creation of new markets raises the expected economic
rent. The firm is thus incited to give up political strategies, and begin to develop economic
strategies.
However, external influences do not tell the whole story about the strategic
transformation of the deregulated firm. They do not answer to all the questions raised
earlier. More precisely, it does not explain why the optimal strategy of the deregulated firm is
not a defensive mixed strategy, i.e. a strategy that aims at impeding the deregulation process,
while developing economic capabilities at the same time. Hence, if a defensive mixed strategy
is the optimal strategy, why would the strategic transformation fully occur? Why wouldn’t the
firm continue rent-seeking for certain markets and become a competitive player in others? To
adress these questions, it is necessary to establish a theoretical link between political and
economic capabilities within the firm. Only internal mechanisms can explain why economic
capabilities get the upper hand over political capabilities.25
4.2. Internal Mechanisms
Two mechanisms are at work within the deregulated firm. On the one hand, the
progressive lack of complementarity between political and economic capabilities explains
why the firm can not adopt a defensive mixed strategy for a long time and still be efficient in
competitive economic markets. On the other hand, economic opportunities are so numerous in
deregulated markets that economic capabilities soon overwhelm political capabilities.
4.2.1. The Complementarity Between Economic and Political Capabilities
Economic and political capabilities are not always complementary. There are
many cases during the deregulation process in which those capabilities are substitutes for each
other. For instance, if the deregulated firm wants to stay politically efficient, it must retain a
high number of employees, creating a high level of organizational slack [Schuler, 1996]. This
is in contradiction with imperatives concerning the improvement of productivity, the ability to
reduce costs, etc., i.e. essential capabilities to become a competitive player. In the same way,
the firm will diversify into different activities if it wants to be politically efficient or it wants
to be economically efficient. To be politically efficient, the firm develops in directions that
will assure its strong political support by the national government. To be economically
efficient, the most important thing is on investment into activities that will allow the
development of new products or new technologies that could satisfy the demand of
consumers. The two perspectives are hugely different. In this case, following a mixed strategy
is not adequate to become a competitive player.
The maintenance of these two substitute capabilities create organizational transaction
costs within the firm. These transaction costs come from the fact that both capabilities can not
be used and developed at the same time within the firm. Therefore, deregulated firms
accumulate economic capabilities more rapidly when they have decided to discard their
political capabilities. As far as strategy is concerned, it means that deregulated firms have to26
give up slowing down the deregulation process on their historical market if they really want to
become competitive players. This is why they must evolve from mixed strategies to purely
economic strategies if they wish to become competitive players quickly enough to face the
competition of new entrants. Our analysis can be summarized in the following analytical
proposition: because we assume that the deregulated firm can not invest both in political and
economic capabilities, an increase in its economic capabilities is related to a decrease in its










4.2.2. Economic Capabilities overwhelm political capabilities.
There are more strategic opportunities in economic markets than in political markets.
Being able to obtain rapidly many economic capabilities, the firm discovers a large amount of
opportunities on the economic market. These opportunities require many other economic
capabilities that generate, at their turn, information and opportunities. This means that the firm
discovers spontaneously many more economic opportunities than political opportunities. More
and more, the firm naturally takes on an economic structure, evolving away from the political
structure that was prevalent before.
Since political and economic capabilities become substitutes, people inside the firm
must choose between the two. The motivation for their choice is their expectations of which
type of capability will prevail on the future. Since economic capabilities tend to develop more
rapidly than political ones, and since the expected economic rent for the firm is increasing
faster than the political rent, people tend to prefer economic capabilities. As in the
competition between two standards [Besen and Farell, 1994], where the two standards are not
compatible, both types of capabilities are not complementary. In the end, one set of
capabilities will dominate within the firm. People develop the type of capabilities that they
expect will dominate in the future, hastening the extinction of the others. When economic27
capabilities are numerous enough to constitute an installed base, network externalities entail
the “ tipping effect ” [Farrell and Shapiro, 1992], and economic capabilities dominate political
capabilities. The firm passes from defensive mixed strategies to economic strategies or
offensive mixed strategies.
Proposition 2:
By a certain amount of Ce, Ce
t+1 - Ce
t  > Ce
t - Ce





Mechanisms enhanced in propositions 1 and 2 combine within the firm in such a way
that economic capabilities become dominant and largely independent on political capabilities.
This entails the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm.
5. Explaining the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm
5.1. External and internal mechanisms are both necessary to explain the transformation of the
firm
5.1.1. The role of external mechanisms
The main role of external mechanisms is to trigger the beginning of the
transformation process, through a negative impact on the political rent that the firm can
expect from regulation.  Nothing can happen if there is no change in this expected political
rent. The political market is on a stage of equilibrium, and rent-seeking behaviors within the
firm do not have any reason to stop. Conversely, the beginning of the deregulation process
generates external mechanisms, changes the expectations of managers within the firm, and
then trigger the strategic evolution.
External mechanisms also play an important role by revealing new sources of
rent in the economic field that were so far ignored by the firm. This is also very important
since it partly explains why the firm does not only try to search new rent-seeking opportunities
to protect its political rents, but also ventures into economic behaviors. The need to develop or
acquire two kinds of capabilities becomes obvious. Here begins the question of
complementarity of these two kinds of capabilities that will create the internal mechanisms.28
Therefore, external mechanisms are very important to explain the strategic
transformation of the deregulated firm since they are at the root of this transformation process,
and determine the general trend of the process, i.e. the evolution from rent-seeking behaviors
towards economic behaviors.
5.1.2. The role of internal effects
Internal mechanisms do not play a huge role on the short run: Internal effects
depend on capabilities, and capabilities are slow to develop and accumulate at the beginning
of the deregulation process. It is especially the case in utilities market where years of regulated
monopoly have forbidden other firms to provide complementary economic capabilities.
Therefore, there is no market for economic capabilities and these capabilities have to be newly
developed. This is a slow process. It explains why problems of complementarity of economic
and political capabilities do not arise on the short run. Political capabilities are still dominant
and mainly determine the strategic behavior of the firm, even if promising economic
capabilities are being developed within the organization.
But internal mechanisms are predominant on the long run: When the stock of
economic capabilities becomes significant, problems of complementarity of economic and
political capabilities appear. Internal mechanisms reinforce this lack of complementarity of
both kinds of capabilities, which creates an obstacle to the efficiency of strategies, thus
forcing the firm to choose. This explains why the deregulated firm can not keep significant
political capabilities in the long run if it wishes to become a competitive economic player
when markets are opened.
In the same way, a network externality effect in the development of capabilities play a
role in the long run, since it is only possible when the firm has developped an “ installed
base  ” of existing capabilities. When this installed base has been created, new
complementarities appear, leading to network externalities in the development of capabilities.
These capabilities also reveal pockets of ignorance in the market, and thus opportunities to29
extract economic rents. This second internal mechanism explains why the firm chooses
to concentrate upon the development of economic capabilities and not upon the development
of political capabilities.
To conclude, one can say that if there is no external mechanism, no transformation
occurs within the deregulated firm; if there is no internal mechanism it is not possible to argue
that the transformation can be completed. Both external and internal mechanisms that
characterize the deregulated firm are thus important to explain its strategic transformation.
However, these two kinds of mechanisms are not to be considered independently. In reality,
they combine within the firm, which give them significant strength.
We can represent the evolution of rents and capabilities, either economic or political,
by the following figure. The beginning of the strategic transformation is driven by external
mechanisms, particularly those concerning the shrinking of political rent and the increasing of
economic rent. Then, the firm begins to develop new economic capabilities. Internal
mechanisms become more and more important. They considerably accelerate the process of
change within the firm. That is why, on chart 1, capabilities have such a convex aspect. Note
that the evolution of both economic and political assets is here represented as symetric, which
is not necessarily the case. We use a symetrical representation for the clarity of the chart.
Chart 1: Evolution of rents and capabilities during the deregulation process
Index of the  Internal
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level of political
assets                   
Rp
         Cp
Time (deregulation process)
Consequently, both types of effects are necessary to explain why deregulated firms can
be deeply transformed, evolving from pure political strategies to economic strategies.
5.2. Evolution of the strategic decision of the deregulated firm
5.2.1. xF compared to the status quo x0
With the evolution of capabilities and rents described above, xF tends to be more and
more different than x0. At the beginning of the deregulation process, xF is mainly determined
by political rent and capabilities, as the firm is still a regulated monopoly. Then, more and
more, Cp and Rp decrease whereas Re and later Ce begin to soar. As Cp and Rp become
negligeable, the strategic decision of the firm, xF, is more and more determined by Re and
Ce.This is the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm.
Being more and more determined by Re and Ce, the firm adopts positions in regulatory
debates which are always farther from the status quo. This leads to the strategic transformation
of the deregulated firm.
5.2.2. Completion of the strategic transformation
The strategic transformation is completed when the position of the firm is not only
very far from the status quo position, but is also superior to the position that is finally adopted.
In this case, the firm has stopped defensive rent-seeking activities to concentrate upon
economic activities. It is the implementation of these economic activities that may require an
offensive rent-seeking, for instance if regulatory authorities try to maintain regulation in the
sector.
We can use Spiller and Vogelsang’s [1997] representation of the regulatory process to
sum up this strategic transformation. Two periods are then distinguished in chart 2: the31
beginning of the deregulation process, where the firm adopts a purely political strategy to try
to keep its monopoly rents; the end of the deregulation process, where the firm tries to
accelerate the deregulation, to be able to seize the discovered opportunities and overcome
remaining regulations that limit its ability to seize these opportunities. Both external and
internal mechanisms are then at work to lead incrementally to the strategic transformation of
the deregulated firm.
Chart 2 : The strategic transformation of the deregulated firm
Beginning of the strategic transformation
xR x0xF
xF mainly determined by Cp and Rp.
Pure political strategy
STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION
End of the strategic transformation
xF xR x0
xF mainly determined by Ce and Re
Pure economic strategy
Compared to Spiller and Vogelsang’s work, our analysis constitutes another aspect of
the same question. We do not try to determine which institutional mechanisms limit the
administrative discretion to achieve deregulation, but we show how institutional, competitive
and organizational mechanisms progressively affect the strategic choices of the former
monopoly, and generate the success of deregulation.
However, if the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm is then completed, it
does not mean that regulation does not evolve anymore. The process of regulatory change
remains uncertain, and firms have still to find organizational and strategic solutions to face
this uncertainty.32
6. Conclusion
The introduction of recent advances in the theory of the firm into the political theory of
regulation allows us to explain why the deregulated firm, which was formerly a monopoly in
utility markets, decides step by step to give up rent-seeking strategies to adopt economic
strategies. This strategic transformation of the deregulated firm was only partially explained
by the political theory of regulation, either the public choice view or the New Institutional
Economics view. In this article, we show that the former is limited by its systematic use of the
profit-maximizing rule to explain the strategic behavior of the firm. Unfortunately, the latter
just focuses on institutional mechanisms but does not take into account strategies that are
specific to the deregulated firm.
To explain the strategic transformation of the deregulated firm, we have thus
considered the process of change in real time. This can be done in taking into account not only
the rent (or profits) that the firm expects to obtain at each step of the deregulation process, but
also the capabilities that it can manage to develop or acquire in both the economic and
political realms. Strategic decisions made by the deregulated firm spring from these two
variables.
As we have shown, expected rents and existing capabilities in either the political or
economic realms are submitted to two distinct influences during the deregulation process.
First, external influences come from evolutions in regulatory governance and from the entries
of competitors. These external influences are a very important source of change, but do not
tell the whole story about the strategic transformation. Indeed, they can not explain why the
firm should discard its political capabilities when it tries to develop its economic capabilities.
This can just be accounted for by mechanisms that are at work inside the firm. These
mechanisms are linked to the internal transaction costs and adjustment costs that arise during
the deregulation process because economic and political capabilities tend to be less and less33
complementary. Then, they become substitutes, which means that the firm must choose
between them to be really effective.
Changes in the institutional environment and changes inside the firm are co-lateral.
Both have impacts on each other. That is why the deregulated firm may decide to accelerate
the deregulation process, and adopt new rent-seeking strategies, because changes inside the
firm are more rapid than institutional changes. All this means that there is a continuous
movement toward economic behaviors for the former monopoly during the deregulation
process.
The theoretical framework that is developed in this article is compatible with the
institutional framework developped by Spiller or Weingast. We assume that it is a
complementary analysis, where not only political institutional mechanisms are analyzed, but
also organizational mechanisms. This framework is also compatible with North’s [1990] or
Baumol’s [1990] approachs to economic growth, which is based on the idea that institutions
determine the allocation of entrepreneurial activities, between productive and unproductive
activities. To some extent, we show here how former monopolies can behave as
entrepreneurs, and then contribute to economic of growth when they are deregulated.
We have attempted to explain in which circumstances the strategic transformation of
the deregulated firm involved in utilities could be completed. For further research, we believe
that a similar theoretical framework could also be used to explain why, sometimes, the
strategic transformation is not fully completed, i.e. why a firm can sometimes keep monopoly
rents throughout the deregulation process. It may be because external influences have not
triggered a strong decline of the political rent or have not effectively questioned political
capabilities, or because internal mechanisms have not raised transaction costs enough within
the firm to require a substitution between the two kinds of capabilities.
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